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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

(Romania)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. O.O. ADESOLA
Mr. G.O. OJO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN
Mr. Y.P. VIKTOROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN
Mr. J.E.D. STREET

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C.G. BREAN
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Romania) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and sixty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker on my list, I should like to associate myself, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, with the words of welcome that were addressed during the previous meeting to the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Committee has decided to examine first, after the general debate, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this question one can see with particular clearness how the artificial slowing-down of the achievement of agreement and the delay in drafting a treaty are creating more and more obstacles in the way to the objective set before us by the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. With every day that passes we are not only not getting any nearer to that objective but are perhaps moving farther away from it.

The reason for this situation is that one of the participants in the negotiations, namely the United States of America, has placed its policy in NATO and its plans for strengthening its military alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany above the interests of solving the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, above the demands of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this question the main consideration of the United States is western Germany, which in its turn is striving its utmost to obtain access to nuclear weapons.

In fact, the United States is suggesting to the Committee that it should find a solution to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- if indeed the very word "solution" is appropriate -- whereby the West German revanchists would obtain access to these weapons legalized by an international agreement. The basic idea running through both the original and the amended United States draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152 and Add.1) is the retention of loop-holes and actually the legalization of the spread of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances.

Having set itself the aim of reconciling and combining in a single package two contrary objectives: namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons outside military alliance and blocs, and plans for the proliferation of such weapons within the

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framework of Western blocs and alliances, and in the first place in NATO through the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force or a NATO Atlantic nuclear force, as well as through the so-called "sharing of nuclear responsibility" within the framework of that organization, the United States has thereby led the consideration of the problem of non-proliferation into an impasse. To seek to combine and reconcile two contrary objectives -- non-proliferation and simultaneously proliferation of nuclear weapons within the framework of military alliances -- means to condemn to failure the task of achieving an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. That circumstance has been noted not only by our delegation but also by members of the United States Senate, who have undertaken the work of studying in detail the position of the United States on this question.

Thus, speaking in the United States Senate on 17 May of this year, Senator Clark stated:

"In short, our problem is to choose between agreement with the Russians to join in a major effort to prevent the further spread of national nuclear capability or to continue to flirt with such schemes as MLF, ANF, and the actual sharing of nuclear weapons with West Germany.

"I have no doubt that both world peace and our own national security interests strongly impel us to the former course -- that is to say, agreement with the Russians ...

"Consequently I hope -- and this is not the first time that I have expressed this hope -- that the executive branch will abandon its efforts to provide for nuclear sharing by West Germany through NATO, a multilateral force, an Atlantic nuclear force, or otherwise." (Congressional Record, United States Senate, Vol.112, No.81, p.10287)

In the same speech Senator Clark deemed it necessary to mention specifically -- and I quote -- "the somewhat restricted and unusual definition" of the term "control" given by the United States delegation in Geneva. As the concept of "control" is indeed the key concept in the present United States draft treaty on non-proliferation, permit me to dwell on this in somewhat greater detail.

According to the text of the United States draft treaty, control means "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State". That definition is taken from the proposal submitted by the

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United States in our Committee in March of this year (ENDC/152/Add.1, p.2). Thus there is the prohibition only of the unilateral use of nuclear weapons. The rest of the United States draft allows one to do whatever one likes with nuclear weapons.

For instance, under the United States draft treaty any non-nuclear State may obtain nuclear weapons, store them, position them where it chooses -- on land or sea -- transport them, keep them attached to its missiles or in its aeroplanes, target them on any State or any point. It can proclaim a state of emergency and order general mobilization, using nuclear weapons as a threat or as a means of blackmail in regard to other States. Moreover, very considerable nuclear arsenals might be involved.

In other words, under the United States draft treaty a non-nuclear State will actually obtain, or at any rate can obtain, complete access to nuclear weapons. In order to start a nuclear war it has only to obtain the consent, the concurrent decision-- I stress these words of the United States draft treaty -- of any nuclear State. It should be noted, however, that the United States draft treaty does not even specify from whom the permission to fire nuclear weapons can come. It speaks of the concurrent decision of "any" nuclear State. Such a decision, apparently, can be taken by the State which transferred the nuclear weapons, or it can, under the United States draft treaty, also be taken by any other existing nuclear State. In other words, having obtained physical access to nuclear weapons, a non-nuclear State can carry on a large-scale political game with nuclear Powers, a game which could also be directed against the State from which it had received the nuclear weapons.

One can easily imagine what dangerous situations could arise on the international scene in those circumstances. There are many examples in history, including quite recent ones, of how, in arming one State against another, the instigator of an arms race ended by being himself the victim of it. It is true that in those days there were no nuclear weapons.

But let us suppose that the United States has in mind that it is precisely the nuclear Power which provided the nuclear weapons that will have to take the decision regarding their use. Even such an interpretation opens up very gloomy prospects. Let us imagine that a nuclear Power which has granted nuclear weapons to its ally in a military bloc in Europe, Asia or Latin America will in fact use the right to authorize the firing of those weapons. In what situation will the other nuclear and

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non-nuclear Powers of that bloc find themselves? They run the risk of being involved in a nuclear war by the decision of the aforementioned two States -- the one that gave the weapons and the one that received them.

It is necessary to stress particularly that the so-called "right of veto" provided for in the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation will be illusory. After all, in order to get hold of a nuclear arsenal a State has only to promise that it will not fire nuclear weapons without someone else's permission. Once it has obtained the weapons, a State that has aggressive intentions can easily repudiate its earlier promises. Remember how, between the two world wars, Hitler's Germany flouted all the restrictions on its rearmament. In these days the restrictions on the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany are being cancelled one after the other.

Of course, neither the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor many other States can base their security on the "right of veto" which the United States evidently counts on possessing. Experience shows that one cannot place any confidence in such a right, just as one cannot place any confidence in the control which is supposed to exist over the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At our meeting on 14 June the United States representative, Mr. Foster, tried to defend the position of the Federal Republic of Germany on the question of nuclear weapons, and for this purpose he quoted a joint communiqué issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard on 21 December 1965 (ENDC/PV.264, pp.23, 24). We should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that, in that and in other statements of the Federal Republic of Germany on the question of non-proliferation, stress is laid on the restricted nature of the obligations by which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers itself bound in matters of nuclear armament. In those statements of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany nothing is said about the attitude of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the idea of concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a treaty without loop-holes, as is called for by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany passes over in silence the possibility of non-nuclear States being given access to nuclear weapons through existing military groupings of Powers. On the other hand, it actively champions

"participation in nuclear defence" -- and I am quoting from the communiqué of 21 December 1965. It demands "participation in the nuclear weapon system". Those are the words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schroeder. I would also like to remind the Committee that on 22 December 1965, the day after the aforesaid communiqué was signed, Chancellor Erhard stated in a television interview that the nuclear problems of NATO should have priority over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation has already asked the United States delegation what situation would arise if, at a given moment, the partners of the United States in NATO or in military blocs in other parts of the world refused to take account of the "right of veto". What would happen if they were able to open the electronic locks by which this veto will allegedly be safeguarded? We have so far received no answer to these questions. Yet their importance is perfectly obvious.

In the past the Soviet delegation has dwelt on the fact that the United States draft treaty not only provides an opportunity for actually circumventing the far-fetched "right of veto", but also contains provisions which allow of such circumvention while complying with all juridical rules. I am referring to article 1, paragraph 3 of the United States draft treaty. Here, in fact, the possibility is envisaged that one or another nuclear Power will give up the right to use nuclear weapons in favour of a group of States or in favour of the whole military alliance. That is to say, one nuclear Power will thus be transformed into a whole series of nuclear States, and instead of one there may be five, ten, fourteen or fifteen Powers having the right and ability to use nuclear weapons.

In other words, a nuclear Power is permitted to be transformed into an association of nuclear States possessing the right to use nuclear weapons. The purport of the introduction of such an element into our discussion is to create, in addition to the factual basis, a juridical basis for the transfer of the right to use nuclear weapons to those who at present have no such right. That fact speaks for itself: juridically and factually the United States draft treaty leaves loop-holes for the spread of nuclear weapons.

The many chinks and loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons which the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation opens up are intended in the first place for the benefit of the States members of the NATO bloc. In this

connexion permit me to recall once again the main objection put forward by the United States to the Soviet treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/164). The United States alleges that the aim of the Soviet draft treaty is to undermine the NATO military bloc. The Soviet delegation has already shown that there is not a shred of truth in such assertions. The United States draft treaty, by creating for the members of military blocs the possibility of obtaining access to nuclear weapons, obviously pursues the aim of strengthening the position of the United States in NATO and at the same time of bringing other States into the NATO alliance; but it certainly does not pursue the aim of completely preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is quite obvious that the United States proposals cannot at all solve the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the adoption of the United States draft treaty would be an incentive to non-nuclear States to acquire nuclear weapons.

It is significant that in the present international situation even the Federal Republic of Germany, having proclaimed a policy of border revision and having set out on the path of militarism, deems it necessary to be as cautious as possible in its demands for nuclear weapons. It is behaving in this way because it sees the emphatic opposition of world public opinion to plans for arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, including plans for arming it through a NATO nuclear force of any kind whatsoever. It is compelled to take account of the forces that are opposed to this, the forces that are opposed to any proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The adoption of the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation would mean, as we have already emphasized, legalization of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through military blocs and alliances. The ruling circles of West Germany would no longer have the political and other misgivings which at present compel them to be cautious. West German militarists will pursue even more insistently their cherished aim, the possession of nuclear weapons, on the strength of the draft treaty which has been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the United States delegation.

Yesterday, 22 June 1966, was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitlerite Germany. We cannot forget the tens of thousands of burnt villages and towns, ruined factories and flooded mines, the destruction of objects of cultural value, the Fascist extermination camps. We cannot resurrect twenty million

Soviet citizens and many millions of people of other countries who were killed or tortured, or died of hunger and disease in the territory of the Soviet Union and in the territories of many other States of Europe that were occupied for a time by the Hitlerite soldiery.

In the hearts of the Soviet people there is no feeling of vengefulness, but we cannot ignore the occurrences that I have just recalled. We know from our own experience what German militarism means, and that is why we are resolutely fighting the revanchist policy pursued by the militaristic forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. In no circumstances can we agree to that country's obtaining access to nuclear weapons. That is why we urge the earliest possible reaching of an understanding on an effective agreement on a non-proliferation treaty.

The Soviet Government, which regards the solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament as the basic task before the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the present time, advocates the immediate conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons our delegation bases its position on the Soviet draft treaty, which fully ensures the achievement of the aims mentioned in resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161).

Articles I and II of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) provide for prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons in any form to the ownership or control of non-nuclear States or groups of States; and they also prohibit the granting to such States of the right of participation in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The prohibition also extends to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Thus Articles I and II, as indeed the whole of the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, close completely every chink and every loop-hole through which the spread of nuclear weapons might occur.

In this connexion I should like to draw your attention to the fact that it is precisely in the Soviet draft treaty that there are no restrictions to the concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As we have already pointed out, the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation, unlike the United States proposal, does not provide for any "right of veto" in regard to the use of nuclear weapons. There is no need

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for such a right of veto, for the simple reason that the Soviet draft treaty precludes the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons and therefore the question of the "right of veto" and its use does not and cannot arise. Not one of the non-nuclear States, however much it wants to use nuclear weapons, will be able to do so, since it will not possess these weapons and will not have any access to them. These nuclear weapons will be beyond the reach of a non-nuclear State, regardless of whether it is or is not a member of a military bloc together with nuclear Powers. We have already pointed out more than once that this will be the only really effective guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is very significant that, during the discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the problem of non-proliferation, no one attempted to cast a shadow of doubt on the fact that the Soviet proposals completely and definitively close all channels for the further spread of nuclear weapons. Not one delegation claimed that the Soviet draft treaty was inadequate in this respect, or that additional provisions were necessary to avert the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet delegation has more than once, including today, demonstrated specifically which of the provisions in the United States draft treaty do not guarantee a solution of the non-proliferation question, and why this is so, we have not yet heard from the United States delegation, nor have we heard from the delegations of the other Western countries, what provisions in the Soviet treaty do not correspond to the aim of non-proliferation or allow for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. There have so far been no such statements.

We are still waiting for business-like comments of this kind from the United States delegation instead of unfounded assertions that the aim of the Soviet draft treaty on non-proliferation is to undermine or even to topple NATO. Apparently we must come to the conclusion that the aim of the policy of NATO and the United States on the one hand, and the aim of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other hand, are incompatible and that one aim contradicts the other. We are compelled, unfortunately, to reach this conclusion.

The Soviet delegation is prepared to consider any amendments and additions to our draft treaty that would correspond to the aim of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. We shall examine such amendments from the point of view of whether they contribute to the common cause and whether they help towards the conclusion of the treaty which the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly calls for.

Let us now establish, by comparing the two draft treaties submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, which of them meets the requirements for solving the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and, if necessary, let us add other clauses to the existing ones in order to provide in a concrete way for the closing of all loop-holes for access to nuclear weapons. We are convinced that the drafting of such a treaty is not at all as complicated as some people try to make us believe. It is necessary to have the will to do so; but unfortunately we have so far not observed this in the United States delegation.

In stressing the fact that a non-proliferation treaty would create a reliable obstacle to further pullulation of nuclear weapons in the world, the delegation of the USSR does not disregard the proposition that was mentioned in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the representatives of a number of States: namely that nuclear and non-nuclear States must assume proportionate obligations under the treaty. We consider that a non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself; it is not a single and isolated measure, but merely a definite stage on the road to the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Since the non-nuclear States, by signing the non-proliferation treaty, would thereby renounce such a means of national defence as nuclear weapons, definite steps towards meeting them must be taken by the nuclear Powers.

An important step of this kind was taken, as you will remember, in the message of the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Kosygin, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in which it was stated that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was prepared to include in the draft treaty a clause on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States (ENDC/167, p.3). The text of such a clause could be drafted, for example, as follows: "The parties to the treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the use of such weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and in whose territory, territorial waters and air space there are no foreign nuclear weapons".

Such a formulation of the question of not using nuclear weapons could, in our opinion, contribute greatly to the achievement of an agreement on non-proliferation. Such an agreement must serve as a starting-point for the accomplishment of a number of other disarmament measures and of measures to reduce international tension, and

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there are indications in this regard in the Soviet draft treaty. The Soviet delegation views the solution of the problem of non-proliferation in the context of the solution of other disarmament problems, such as the ending of all nuclear weapon tests, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and the achievement of agreements on many other problems of nuclear disarmament which have been expounded here by the Soviet delegation during the previous sessions of our Committee.

Permit me to recall that the Soviet Government, in the message of its Head, Mr. Kosygin, to our Committee, has suggested to the nuclear Powers that they consider the question of carrying out immediately the programme relating to nuclear disarmament. Such disarmament must provide for the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated by States, the prohibition of their manufacture, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their production, and the elimination of military bases in foreign territories.

The previous session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee showed that our approach to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation meets with support and understanding among the members of our Committee. At this session we must take action without wasting time and carry out at last the instructions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The differences in our positions are clear, and it is even clearer which of them reflects the demand of the peoples of the world that we put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States must reconsider its position and renounce the idea of using the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to legalize the nuclear arming of its allies and to legalize access to nuclear bombs and charges by the West German revanchists. In order to fulfil the demands of the peoples of the world, we must reach agreement on a draft treaty and submit it to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet delegation is prepared to co-operate constructively in carrying out this task.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have followed attentively the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, in the hope of finding in it a more objective appraisal of the Western proposals and a favourable reply to the specific suggestions which I made at an earlier meeting concerning our methods of work (ENDC/PV.265, pp. 20 et s.). Unfortunately, I found in my Soviet

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colleague's speech this morning only the repetition of an intransigent position together with some polemical remarks. He did not seem to me to be disposed to take into consideration the possibilities, which I had emphasized, of specific work, the work of comparing the two draft treaties in order to arrive at a single text. The Committee will recall that I made certain proposals in that sense at an earlier meeting.

Mr. Roshchin spoke of a slowing-down of the negotiations by the Western delegations. That is a statement which I regret, because, as far as we are concerned, the opposite is true: we have the greatest desire to speed up the negotiations and to give them an ever more specific and effective direction. If there is or has been any delay in our negotiations, this has been due in large part to the introduction of polemical elements having nothing to do with the negotiations themselves. Such arguments are being continually developed throughout the meetings. On 21 June our meeting was taken up almost entirely by a very polemical statement by the representative of Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.266). These polemical elements prevent us in fact from concentrating on really constructive and effective work.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, referred to Senator Clark's report in order to find arguments in support of his thesis. But I, too, have read Senator Clark's report, and I noticed that Mr. Roshchin neglected to quote two passages in which Senator Clark states that the differences between the two draft treaties, when looked at very closely, are much less great than one might think and that harmonization would be possible. I do not have Senator Clark's report available to quote at present, but if Mr. Roshchin will be so good as to re-read it, he will find those statements in it which corroborate the proposal made by certain delegations that we should undertake without delay the specific work of comparing and harmonizing the two texts.

Mr. Roshchin spoke of the slowing-down of the negotiations; but on the other hand he avoided replying to the very numerous questions asked by my delegation in the course of a previous intervention during the last session -- very important questions touching upon the very essence of the Soviet draft treaty.

Among these questions is one which, in our opinion, is very important: whether the Soviet draft (ENDC/164), which purports not to affect alliances, regards consultation within an alliance as dissemination or not (ENDC/PV.252, p.15). An

alliance, in itself, implies at least consultation between allies. As a matter of fact we have a broader conception of alliances, a conception integrated in several fields; but in any case the basis of an alliance is consultation between allies. Therefore we need to know whether, and up to what point, this integrated consultation would be permitted and would not be regarded as dissemination, once the wording of the Soviet treaty had been accepted. It is at least strange that the Soviet delegation, which has spoken to us at such length about the United States draft treaty and about the Soviet draft treaty, remains silent on a point which, at least as far as we are concerned, appears to us fundamental.

Moreover, it seemed to me that I again discerned in the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, some confusion in his judgment of the Western position, and I should like to endeavour to give him some clarifications, at least from the point of view of my delegation.

The text of the Western draft treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1) corresponds above all, in our opinion, to the essential concern to block for ever the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because we regard this possibility as a real and very grave danger to the stability of the world situation and to peace. However, a non-proliferation treaty cannot disregard two requirements which in our opinion are important, the one concerning the present and the other the future situation. These two requirements derive from two quite distinct and different categories of concern; but in the treaty they find a single language, and this may give rise to some confusion and require further explanations.

The first of these requirements is the preservation of alliances, which are still necessary for a military balance and consequently for peace. When I say "still", as you know, I assert the wish that the progressive application of complete and general disarmament may render possible at a certain time the dissolution of alliances and the establishment of a world system of collective security. Until that time, however, the adoption of a non-proliferation treaty cannot disrupt the internal organization of either alliance. It seemed to me, I must say, that Mr. Roshchin realized this necessity when he stated during a previous meeting that the Soviet draft treaty, while preventing dissemination, was not intended to affect alliances (ENDC/PV.264, p.20). That idea seemed to me to come close to our own. But Mr. Roshchin does not draw the conclusions which in my opinion would be logical and natural.

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Furthermore, the second requirement that I mentioned corresponds to what we call the "European clause". It may be that at a certain time in our history the opportunity will arise in Europe to create a federation composed of nuclear and non-nuclear States. In our opinion that prospect must not be made impossible by a non-proliferation treaty previously concluded by such countries.

A federation is a grouping of States which jointly ensure defence under a unified government. If a nuclear country were obliged by a non-proliferation treaty to which it was a party not to cede its nuclear weapons to anyone, and supposing it wished to join a federation, it would find itself in the following situation: either it would have to renounce its nuclear weapons, which might be very difficult, or it would have to forego joining the federation. Obviously the prospect of a European federation is a remote one, perhaps very remote. But we cannot forget that the treaty we are negotiating, either in the United States text or in the Soviet text, does not lay down any limit for its duration; in theory, at least, it is perpetual. It is thus not so much out of place to concern oneself with a European clause when, like ourselves, one does not want to abandon the hope that the European countries may at some time federate.

Reverting to the views expressed by Mr. Roshchin, I should like to confirm to him that the Western draft treaty is not aimed -- as he seems to think -- at permitting the transformation of a single nuclear country into a vast and dangerous nuclear association, of several nuclear States into a series of nuclear States, as he has said, I believe, this morning. By the adoption of our draft treaty an alliance would remain nuclear through its nuclear participants; the other members, not being nuclear, would not have control over the nuclear weapons, nor could they make those weapons or receive any aid in order to make them. Therefore the alliance could never be transformed into a vast nuclear association, into a conglomeration or a series of nuclear countries.

On the other hand, a federation would indeed be possible, but would receive only the nuclear armaments that one or more of its original members would be able to supply to it when they were absorbed by the federation. Thus the number of countries having nuclear weapons at their disposal would not be increased. It is to be presumed -- and I think that this could be specified, if it were so desired, in the treaty -- that the new federation would assume all the obligations already accepted by the nuclear country or countries members of the federation at the time of their joining the federation itself.

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To sum up, what I should like to stress is that in the examination of our treaty one must not confuse alliance with federation. Those are two concepts, distinct and different in perspective. One must be careful not to assimilate them, because that would be contrary to our idea. Both remain subject to non-proliferation, with their own characteristics and by their own particular rules.

Those are the remarks that I wished to make today concerning the statement made by Mr. Roshchin. Of course, I wish to study the text of that statement before giving any further opinion.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, I should like to thank the representative of Italy for responding to some of the unfortunate points that the representative of the Soviet Union has felt it necessary to bring into this discussion. I had not planned to speak today, and I reserve the right to answer at a later meeting some of the destructive comments which Mr. Roshchin has chosen to put forth this morning. Nevertheless, I shall answer some of the tired charges which have been made by him.

In the first place, the head of the Soviet delegation quoted a distinguished Senator of the United States at length, but with certain omissions to which attention has been called by the representative of Italy. The Soviet representative implied that the United States Senator was supporting the Soviet thesis.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States has a democratic process which allows for the expression of differing opinions on any subject. Out of such free exchange, we believe, there develop the soundest policies. Senator Clark's comments are set forth and received in that spirit. However, the execution of United States foreign policy is the responsibility of the President of the United States, and his final judgment, after taking into account all such expressions of opinion, is what governs United States policy. I am sure that the representative of the Soviet Union, because of his competence in the field of history, is well aware of that fact.

Mr. Roshchin has sought to question the sincerity of the United States in seeking a non-proliferation treaty. He has claimed that the United States prefers to satisfy alleged nuclear ambitions of the Federal Republic of Germany and that the United States no longer attaches top priority to a non-proliferation treaty but seeks instead to lead treaty negotiations "into an impasse". I think that it is clear to this Committee that nothing could be further from the truth.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the United States has sought to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and to bring about an effective international agreement to that end. The United States needs no lectures from those who have given nuclear assistance to the Communist Chinese. Of course, that assistance in the spread of nuclear weapons may now be regarded with dismay by those who granted it, but they have no basis for imputing to the United States an intention to disseminate nuclear weapons. The record of our endeavours to reach agreement on curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons is unmistakably clear.

During each of the past three years the President of the United States has urged that this Conference strive with determination to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. When our Conference opened its discussion this year, President Johnson placed a non-proliferation treaty first among the seven points which he put before this group (ENDC/165). We can assure each delegation here that negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty remains first on the agenda for the Government of the United States, and it remains first on the agenda for the people of the United States. I think that most representatives in the Committee are aware that on 17 May of this year the United States Senate adopted unanimously a resolution supporting urgent efforts on the part of the United States to achieve a treaty on non-proliferation. The United States delegation has tried to carry out that objective in practical ways.

In August 1965 we were the first to submit to this Committee a draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/152) designed to facilitate our negotiations here. After we had heard comments and suggestions from others, both here and in New York, we then submitted amendments (ENDC/152/Add.1) to improve our draft. Those are the facts concerning this situation.

Regrettably, the representative of the Soviet Union has also taken the time of this Committee again to launch completely spurious charges against the Federal Republic of Germany. Only on Tuesday of last week he paraded before us the same old charges, and I felt compelled in response to describe with specificity the policies and intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.264). I shall not take the time to do so again. However, the propagandistic, violent and frequent attacks by the Soviet Union against the Federal Republic of Germany cause real concern. We have no fear that those tirades will affect anybody's sound judgment concerning the real facts; but we submit that the Soviet delegation now seems to be more interested in propaganda than in negotiation.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We hope that the Soviet representative may still demonstrate here by constructive proposals and, may I say, serious interventions that his delegation is not interested in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee merely as a forum for fulminations against the Federal Republic of Germany. We should be able to leave behind his diatribes about who is most interested in non-proliferation if he would put business-like proposals before us. Recriminations of the kind to which we have listened this morning do not provide the means for us to make headway with the serious task with which we have been charged.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I had not intended to reply today to the remarks of the representatives of Italy and the United States, as I wished to have the opportunity to study them carefully and to answer them more fully. But one opinion expressed by the representatives of both the United States and Italy obliges me to reply. Both those representatives tried to maintain that we are not conducting business-like negotiations but are more concerned with propaganda. That assertion of those two representatives of the Western Powers does not correspond at all to the state of affairs which we observe every day in the Committee, particularly -- and I would say, especially -- in considering the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have before us two draft treaties: that of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. In regard to the United States draft treaty we have put forward three substantive objections which are perfectly clear and specific. We stated that the definition of "control" given in the United States draft treaty, which means right or ability to fire nuclear weapons -- I stress, to fire nuclear weapons -- without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State (ENDC/152/Add.1) is altogether unsatisfactory. That this definition is altogether unsatisfactory is also admitted by, among many others, Senator Clark.

Why is it unsatisfactory? Because it does not cover many of the most essential and elementary provisions regarding nuclear weapons. It does not cover the prohibition of possession of nuclear weapons; it does not cover proposals to dispose of nuclear weapons, as we have pointed out -- to target them, to carry out nuclear mobilizations and manoeuvres of various kinds, to threaten, to blackmail and so on. All this it does not cover. It covers only one thing: namely the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of any existing nuclear weapon State. That is an altogether unsatisfactory definition.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

We objected to another provision contained in the United States draft, the "right of veto". We consider that there is no place for a right of veto in any treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is an entirely concrete, definite comment containing no elements of propaganda and aimed at a concrete examination of the most important provisions of the treaty.

Thirdly, we stated that we objected to a provision such as that contained in article I, paragraph 3 of the United States draft treaty and reading: "Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons" (*ibid.*). This clause provides that the number of States and alliances of States possessing nuclear weapons must remain the same. We say that this implies legalizing the spread of nuclear weapons because, thanks to this provision, a nuclear Power can hand over its nuclear weapons to an alliance of non-nuclear States.

Those are our three perfectly precise and concrete comments. They contain no propaganda but a circumstantial, detailed examination of the political, juridical and other aspects of the United States proposal.

We shall now put a question to the representatives of the Western Powers. Will you tell us -- in the same way as I have quoted three provisions from the United States draft treaty -- which provisions in our draft treaty do not suit you? Neither the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, nor the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, has made a single comment concerning our draft treaty throughout our lengthy discussions here. I leave it to the members of the Committee to judge how far our statement can be regarded as propaganda, and how far the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers are not propaganda. I should like to ask what specific comments on the question of non-proliferation they have put forward either today or at any time, leaving aside the various general observations to the effect that we are, allegedly, interpreting incorrectly the policy of Western Germany, and so on.

Of course, one can put forward here hypothetical suppositions, such as, for instance, the establishment of a European federation, for which, as the representative

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

of Italy himself pointed out, the prospects are very remote. I stress his words -- "very remote". One can, of course, put forward these hypotheses in order to make the Committee's examination of a concrete treaty more difficult. One can discuss how to make provision in a treaty for the event that within a few decades an All-European federation will be established, and for what is to be done in that event about the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons from one Power to such an alliance or federation. One can obstruct any specific question with all manner of hypothetical theories and prospects, which are not of present interest and which, as Mr. Cavalletti admitted, relate to the very remote future.

Those are the preliminary comments to which I should like to limit my statement today in order to show that the representatives of the Western Powers are altogether unjust in asserting that we are carrying on propaganda here, and are engaged solely in making propaganda speeches whereas they are urging us to conduct some sort of concrete negotiations. Today's statements show exactly the opposite, and our aim is precisely to bear witness to this.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should merely like to emphasize that I spoke only about the waste of time and the need to go deeper into the negotiations and to speed them up. I did not make any particular accusation in regard to the conduct of the Soviet delegation. I merely said that my delegation wishes our negotiations to become more specific and constructive, and I believe that on that point -- or at least I hope so -- the Soviet delegation, which has accused us of slowing down the negotiations, will agree.

As for the questions which, according to Mr. Roshchin, have remained unanswered, I ask him to be good enough to read the statement which I made this morning, because he will find in it precisely the answers to the questions which he asked.

I spoke of a European federation. For us that is no useless complication. It is a very serious matter; it is a political objective of my Government. It is a remote objective, but we attach great importance to it. I dealt with that subject this morning, I repeat, not in order to complicate the negotiations or the issues, but solely because, in a very straightforward way, we wish to clarify as far as possible our thoughts about the draft treaty, which may have some obscure aspects. I hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will for his part, do the same in regard to its draft treaty.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 267th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Dumitrescu, representative of Romania.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Italy and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 28 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.